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Abstract 
 
A recent theoretical emphasis on complex interactions within neural systems underlying 
consciousness has been accompanied by proposals for the quantitative characterization of 
these interactions. Here, we distinguish key aspects of consciousness that are amenable to 
quantitative measurement from those that are not. We carry out a formal analysis of the 
strengths and limitations of three quantitative measures of dynamical complexity in the 
neural systems underlying consciousness: neural complexity, information integration, and 
causal density. We find that no single measure fully captures the multidimensional 
complexity of these systems and all have practical limitations. Our analysis suggests 
guidelines for the specification of alternative measures which, in combination, may 
improve the quantitative characterization of conscious neural systems. Given that some 
aspects of consciousness are likely to resist quantification altogether, we conclude that a 
satisfactory theory is likely to be one that combines both qualitative and quantitative 
elements.    
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Introduction 
 
 Any scientific study of consciousness is based on the premise that phenomenal 
experience is entailed by neuronal activity in the brain.  Given this premise, an adequate 
theory of consciousness must be consistent with physics and with evolutionary principles. 
Non-physical or dualistic forces or processes must be excluded, and neural mechanisms 
of consciousness must emerge ontogenetically and provide adaptive advantage to a 
species via the ongoing exchange of signals among brains, bodies, and environments. 
Ideally, a theory of consciousness should propose neural mechanisms that account for its 
various features, which range from the multimodal characteristics of conscious scenes to 
the emergence of a first-person perspective (1, 2). An adequate theory should also 
consider whether certain of these features are susceptible to a quantitative analysis. In this 
regard, a fundamental property of conscious scenes is that they are both differentiated 
(reflecting the discriminatory capability of consciousness; i.e., every conscious scene is 
one among a vast repertoire of different possible conscious scenes) and also integrated 
(reflecting the unity of conscious experience; every conscious scene is experienced ‘all of 
a piece’) (1, 3).  In this paper we summarize a theoretical framework (1) provided by the 
theory of neuronal group selection (TNGS), which is consistent with these requirements 
(1, 4-6).  We then extend this framework by considering the strengths and limitations of 
several formal measures that have been proposed to characterize the balance between 
differentiation and integration in the complex neuronal dynamics responsible for 
consciousness (1, 3, 7). We refer to this balance as the ‘relevant complexity’ of the 
system. 
    
 According to the TNGS, the brain is a selectional system and not an instructional 
system like a computer. During development and behavior, vast numbers of variant 
neuronal circuits are generated. These constitute complex repertoires from which circuits 
shaped by the constraints of value systems are selected to assure adaptive behavior of the 
organism. In this context, ‘value’ refers to the positive or negative salience of an event 
for the organism, as determined by evolution and learning. Value is mediated by diffuse 
ascending neural pathways originating, for example, in dopaminergic, catecholaminergic, 
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and cholinergic brainstem nuclei. Spatiotemporal coordination of the neural activity 
underlying these selectional events is achieved mainly by a process of reentry. Reentry is 
the dynamic recursive exchange of signals across massively parallel axonal systems that 
reciprocally link maps and nuclei in the brain. 
 
 The TNGS proposes that consciousness is entailed by extensive reentrant 
interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system, the so-called 
dynamic core (1, 3, 7-10). These interactions, which support high-dimensional 
discriminations among states of the dynamic core, confer selective advantages on the 
organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual categorization to value-
dependent memory. The high dimensionality of these discriminations is proposed to be a 
direct consequence of the rich complexity of the participating neural repertoires. A key 
claim of the TNGS is that conscious qualia are these high-dimensional discriminations (1, 
9).  Just as conscious scenes are both differentiated and integrated at the phenomenal 
level to yield high-dimensional discriminations, so also are the reentrant dynamics of 
their underlying neural mechanisms differentiated and integrated. Useful measures of the 
relevant complexity of the neural systems underlying consciousness should therefore 
reflect this dynamic balance in the activity of the dynamic core. 
 
 To be useful, a quantitative measure should satisfy several constraints. Inasmuch 
as conscious experience is engendered by physical neuronal operations within the brain, a 
suitable measure should reflect the fact that consciousness is a dynamic process (11), not 
a thing or a capacity. This point is particularly important in light of the observation that 
conscious systems are embodied and bodies are embedded in and act within 
environments. Conscious scenes arise ultimately from transactions between organisms 
and environments, and these transactions are fundamentally processes. This 
characterization does not, however, exclude ‘off-line’ conscious scenes, for example 
those experienced during dreaming, reverie, abstract thought, planning, or imagery.  A 
suitable measure should also take account of causal interactions within a neural system, 
and between a neural system and its surroundings – i.e., bodies and environments.  
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Finally, to be of practical use, a suitable measure should also be computable for systems 
composed of large numbers of neuronal elements.  
 
 The ability to assess quantifiable aspects of consciousness at the neural level 
without first person report would be useful for the assessment of depth of anesthesia (12) 
as well as in the analysis of various neurological and psychiatric disorders (13).  
Application of quantitative measures may also contribute to comparative studies of 
consciousness. The attribution of conscious states to non-human animals is made difficult 
by their inability verbally to report the contents of their putative consciousness (14).  A 
quantitative measure of relevant complexity might provide one criterion for assessing the 
relative degree of consciousness in such non-human animals (15).  
 
 Obviously, the quantitative characterization of relevant complexity can only 
constitute one aspect of a scientific theory of consciousness. This is true at both the 
neural level and at the level of phenomenal experience. At the neural level, no single 
measure could adequately describe the complexity of the underlying brain system (this 
would be akin, for example, to claiming that the complex state of the economy could be 
described by the gross domestic product alone).  At the phenomenal level, conscious 
scenes have many diverse features (1, 14), several of which do not appear to be 
quantifiable by a single measure (see table 1). These include subjectivity, the attribution 
of conscious experience to a self, and intentionality, which reflects the observation that 
consciousness is largely about events and objects.  A critical issue nevertheless remains: 
how can measurable aspects of the neural underpinnings of consciousness be 
characterized? 
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Measuring relevant complexity 
 
In the following, we critically examine three proposed measures of the relevant 
complexity of conscious neural systems: neural complexity, CN, information integration, 
Φ, and a new measure, causal density, cd (16-19). To our knowledge, these are the only 
extant measures that explicitly attempt to quantify the balance between integration and 
differentiation exhibited by a neural system. While these and related measures might also 
be applicable to non-neural systems, we are concerned here in the main with neural 
systems only.  In our analysis of these measures, we investigate how well the constraints 
of process-orientation, causality, and computability are satisfied.  We exclude from 
detailed consideration properties of neuronal dynamics, such as synchrony (20), for 
which explicit measures that can be associated with relevant complexity have not been 
proposed. Moreover, we do not consider several theoretical perspectives that share many 
common features with the dynamic core hypothesis (1), but which are not explicitly 
concerned with quantitative measures of complex dynamics. They include the notions of  
‘coalitions’ of neurons (21), global negatively entropic brain states (22), the ‘global 
workspace’ (23), and association of perceptual events with the coalescence of a 
‘macroscopic pool’ of mesoscopic ‘wave packets’ of neural activity (24).   
 
Neural Complexity 
 
 Neural complexity expresses the extent to which a system is both dynamically 
segregated, so that small subsets of the system tend to behave independently, and 
dynamically integrated, so that large subsets of the system tend to behave coherently (3, 7, 
16).  A practical algorithm for the computation of neural complexity is provided in (16) 
and also in Supplementary Information S1. In brief, the neural complexity CN of a system 
X composed of n elements is equal to the sum of the average mutual information across 
all bipartitions of the system (16). The mutual information between two subsets A and B, 
defined by a single bipartition, measures the uncertainty about A that is accounted for by 
the state of B.  It is calculated as MI(A;B) = H(A) + H(B) – H(AB), where H(.) is the 
informational entropy, i.e., the overall degree of statistical independence.  Under 
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Gaussian assumptions, the entropy of the system, H(X), or the entropy of any subset of 
the system, can be calculated analytically from the covariance matrix COV(X) relating 
the responses of the elements of the system.   
  
 The covariance matrix COV(X) can in turn be calculated analytically from the 
system’s connectivity matrix Cij(X), assuming linear system dynamics and activation of 
network elements by uncorrelated noise (16). Alternatively, COV(X) can be derived 
empirically on the basis of the recorded activity of a network over a specific time period. 
In this case, CN reflects the explicit exchange of signals that takes place either within the 
isolated system or, in a behaving system, during interaction with an external environment 
as an embedded and embodied neural network (25). The concept of neural complexity 
has been extended to characterize the selectional responses of neural systems to inputs in 
terms of ‘matching’ complexity, which is calculated as the total neural complexity of a 
neural system X when the input is present, minus the intrinsic complexity of X and minus 
the complexity that is directly attributable to the input (26).  
 
 Precise calculation of CN requires the evaluation of mutual information across all 
possible bipartitions, which can become computationally prohibitive for large systems. 
There is, however, a tractable approximation to CN which, instead of considering all 
possible bipartitions of a system, considers only those that divide the system into sets 
comprising one single element and all the remaining elements [see (27) and 
Supplementary Information S1]. A disadvantage of CN and its approximation is that they 
do not reflect causal interactions. This is so because CN is based on mutual information, 
which is a symmetric quantity.  
 
Information Integration, Φ   
 
 This measure has been proposed as a way to quantify the total amount of 
information that a conscious system can integrate (18). The theory in which Φ is 
proposed as the central element, the information integration theory of consciousness 
[IITC, (18)], makes the claim that consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system 
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to integrate information, and that Φ measures this capacity: “experience, that is, 
information integration, is a fundamental quantity, just as mass, charge or energy are. It 
follows that any physical system has subjective experience to the extent that it is capable 
of integrating information” [(18), p.19].  Φ is defined in (18) as the ‘effective 
information’ across the informational ‘weakest link’ of a system, the so-called ‘minimum 
information bipartition’ [MIB; see (17, 18) and Supplementary Information S2].  
Effective information is calculated as the mutual information across a partition in the case 
where outputs from one subset have maximum entropy, and the MIB is that partition of 
the system for which the effective information is lowest. 
 
 Inasmuch as Φ was explicitly formulated to measure consciousness as a capacity 
as opposed to a process, two features are critical: (1) determining Φ depends on replacing 
the outputs of all possible subsets of a system with uncorrelated noise, so that each set of 
outputs has maximum entropy (i.e., reflecting all possible activity patterns), and (2) the 
effective information across the majority of partitions is significant only insofar as it 
helps determine which partition is the MIB; the value of Φ depends only on the effective 
information across the MIB. The focus on capacity leads to the counterintuitive 
prediction (18) that a brain with high value of Φ but  displaying no activity at all would 
be conscious.  
 
Unlike CN, Φ reflects causal interactions.  This is so because Φ is based on 
effective information, which is a directional version of mutual information that relies on 
the replacement of the outputs of different subsets of the studied system with maximum 
entropy signals. However, Φ cannot be measured for any non-trivial real-world system, 
for two reasons. First, it is infeasible to replace the outputs of arbitrary subsets of 
complex real neural systems with uncorrelated noise. Second, the evaluation of Φ 
requires the calculation of effective information across each bipartition of a system, and 
there is a factorial growth in the number of partitions that must be examined as the size of 
the network increases, i.e., as with CN, the number of partitions grows approximately as 
nn  for networks of size n. Although the possibility of confronting this issue has been 
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discussed (17), absent an effective approximation, the evaluation of Φ is computationally 
infeasible for large networks.   
 
In contrast to neural complexity CN and causal density cd (19), Φ has been 
proposed as an adequate measure of the “quantity” of consciousness generated by a 
system, such that systems with sufficiently high values of Φ would necessarily be 
conscious (18). It is therefore critical for the IITC that high values of Φ should not be 
obtained from arbitrary non-conscious systems. However, we here show analytically that, 
even for a trivially simple network, Φ may grow without bound as a function of network 
size.  
 
Consider a fully-connected Hopfield-type network (28) with synaptic weights 
from the j-th neuron (j = 1,..,n)  to the i-th neuron (i = 1,..,n) defined by Cij=2j so that 
network activity is updated according to  
 
))((2)1(
1
txftx jnj ji  ==+ ,  where  f(x) = 



≥+
<−
01
01
xif
xif
,   (1) 
 
and where each variable xi(t) describes the (integer value) state of the i-th neuron at  
time t. Consider now a (k, n-k) bipartition, A|B, of the network, i.e., a subset A with k 
neurons and a subset B with n-k neurons. The effective information EI(AB) is given by  
EI(AB) = H(A) + H(B) – H(AB) under conditions in which outputs from A are 
replaced by uncorrelated noise, as specified by the definition of Φ (18). As we show in 
detail in Supplementary Information S2, for the network (1), 
 
EI(AB) =  k bits.        (2) 
 
Similarly, EI(BA) is equal to n-k bits, which implies that 
 
EI(A↔B) = EI(AB) + EI(BA) = n bits.     (3) 
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Since equation (3) does not depend on k, the effective information across every 
bipartition is the same. It is easy to check that the effective information across every 
bipartition of a subset of m neurons (m<n) is equal to m (see Supplementary Information 
S2). Therefore, the information integration value for the complete network is given by 
  
Φ = n bits.         (4) 
 
The above result implies that for any value of Φ associated with a presumably conscious 
neural system, there exists a simple Hopfield-type network that has an equivalent or 
greater Φ, and that would, lead by a key assumption of the IITC (18), to the conclusion 
that this network is conscious.  
 
 Given this assumption (18), it also seems critical for the applicability of the IITC 
that any measured value of Φ not depend on arbitrary choices made by an observer.  
However, any quantitative measure of relevant complexity, including CN, Φ, and cd, will 
vary according to the variables chosen to characterize the system.  With regard to both Φ 
and CN, any measured value involves the calculation of informational entropy, which 
requires the identification of a repertoire of states to which probabilities of occurrence 
can be assigned. For complex neural systems, the identification of such a repertoire 
depends on arbitrary choices for the reason that such systems can be described by many 
different variables, such as transmembrane potentials, action potentials, and local field 
potentials. The repertoire of states corresponding to each variable, or to any combination 
of variables will, in general, be different, and therefore the corresponding values for 
entropy will also be different. Furthermore, the variables describing complex neural 
systems are usually continuous − even an action potential is a continuous event if the 
voltage spike is plotted on a sub-millisecond time scale − which implies a further 
dependency on the observer in the specification of the units in which a given variable is 
measured. As with the choice of variables, this dependency on measurement units applies 
equally to  CN, Φ, and cd . In Supplementary Information S2 we show that a simple 
continuous system consisting of two coupled oscillators can generate an arbitrary, even 
infinite, value for Φ depending on the measurement units selected by the observer.   
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Causal Density 
 
 A balance between dynamical integration and differentiation is likely to involve 
dense networks of causal interactions among neuronal elements. Causal density (cd) is a 
novel measure of causal interactivity that captures dynamical heterogeneity among 
network elements (differentiation) as well as their global dynamical integration (see (19) 
and Supplementary Information S3). Specifically, cd is a measure of the fraction of 
interactions among neuronal elements that are causally significant. It can be calculated by 
applying ‘Granger causality’ (29), a statistical concept of causality that is based on 
prediction: If a signal x1 causes a signal x2, then past values of x1 should contain 
information that helps predict x2, above and beyond the information contained in past 
values of x2 alone.  In practice, Granger causality is tested in the context of multivariate 
linear regression models relating the activities of the elements of the system (30).  
 
 To illustrate Granger causality, suppose that the temporal dynamics of two time 
series, x1(t) and x2(t)  (both of length T), can be described by a bivariate autoregressive 
model: 
 
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tEjtxAjtxAtx pj jpj j 121 ,1211 ,111 +−+−=  ==
  (5) 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tEjtxAjtxAtx pj jpj j 221 ,2211 ,212 +−+−=  ==  
 
where p is the maximum number of lagged observations included in the model (the model 
order, p<T), the matrix A contains the coefficients of the model [i.e., the contributions of 
each lagged observation to the predicted values of x1(t) and x2(t)], and E1 and E2 are 
residuals (prediction errors) for each time series.  If the variance of E1 (or E2) is reduced 
by the inclusion of the x2 (or x1) terms in the first (or second) equation, then it is said that 
x2 (or x1 ) Granger-causes x1 (or x2).  In other words, x2 Granger-causes x1 if the 
coefficients in A12 are jointly significantly different from zero. This can be tested by 
performing an F-test of the null hypothesis that A12 = 0, given assumptions of covariance 
stationarity on x1 and x2. The magnitude of a Granger causality interaction can be 
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estimated by the logarithm of the corresponding F-statistic (31). For present purposes,  it 
is important to note that this concept can be readily extended to the n variable case, where 
n >2,  by estimating an n variable autoregressive model. In this case, x2 Granger-causes x1 
if lagged observations of x2 help predict x1 when lagged observations of all other 
variables x3 … n  are also taken into account.  
 
 Following a Granger causality analysis, the causal density of a system can be 
calculated as 
    )1( −= nncd α      (6) 
 
where α is the total number of significant causal interactions and n(n-1) is the total 
number of directed edges in a fully connected network with n nodes, excluding self-
connections. High causal density indicates that elements within a system are both 
globally coordinated in their activity (in order to be useful for predicting each other’s 
activity) and at the same time dynamically distinct (reflecting the fact that different 
elements contribute in different ways to these predictions).   
 
Causal density is inherently a measure of process.  It cannot be inferred from 
network anatomy alone, but must be calculated on the basis of explicit time series 
representing the dynamic activities of network elements. Because causal density is based 
on a well-established statistical interpretation of causality, it incorporates causal 
interactions by design. We emphasize that the value of cd for a system depends on all 
causal interactions within the system, and not just on those interactions across a single 
bipartition, as is the case for Φ.   
 
A practical problem with the determination of causal density is that multivariate 
regression models become difficult to estimate accurately as the number of variables (i.e., 
network elements) increases. For a network of n elements, the total number of parameters 
in the corresponding multivariate model grows as pn2, and the number of parameters to 
be estimated for any single time series grows linearly (as pn), where p is the model order 
(see equations 5). We note that these dependencies are much lower than the factorial 
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dependency associated with Φ and CN, and may therefore may be more readily 
circumvented.  One possible approach may involve the use of Bayesian methods for 
limiting the number of model parameters via the introduction of prior constraints on 
significant interactions (32). In neural systems, such prior constraints may be derived, for 
example, on the basis of known neuroanatomy or by anatomically-based clustering 
procedures.   
 
From the above analyses, we conclude that while existing formal measures may 
have heuristic value in highlighting the need to characterize differentiation and 
integration in the dynamic core, they remain inadequate in varying degrees. CN can 
reflect process, can be computed for large systems in approximation, but does not capture 
causal interactions. Φ captures causal interactions, but is a measure of capacity not 
process, is infeasible to compute in neural systems of non-trivial size, and can be shown 
to grow without bound even for certain simple networks.  cd reflects all causal 
interactions within a system and is explicitly a measure of process, but it also may be 
difficult to compute for large systems.  
 
The existence of quantitative measures of relevant complexity, however 
preliminary they may be, raises the important issue of identifying the ranges of values 
that would be consistent with consciousness. As we have mentioned, all of the measures 
analyzed above are necessarily based on an exogenously selected repertoire of variables 
and of units of measurement for these variables. This dependency emphasizes the 
requirement that any proposed quantitative measure of consciousness be embedded in a 
qualitative brain theory in order to justify and inform such exogenous selections. These 
selections having been made, it may then become possible to define a measurement scale 
(33) for a proposed measure of relevant complexity by establishing a value for a known 
conscious system (for example, an awake human) and a value for a known non-conscious 
system (for example, the same human during dreamless sleep).   
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Dimensions of relevant complexity 
 
In addition to analyzing whether a proposed measure satisfies the constraints of 
process-orientation, causality, and computability, it is important to consider further 
whether any one measure could be sufficient to assess the relevant complexity of a 
conscious neural system. We suggest that characterizing the relevant complexity of such 
a system will require a multidimensional analysis of transactions within the 
thalamocortical core.  Such a multidimensional analysis is in turn likely to require the 
simultaneous application of multiple formal measures. For example, we can identify three 
distinct dimensions along which the relevant complexity of a conscious neural system is 
likely to vary: spatial complexity, temporal complexity, and recursive complexity. The 
salience of these dimensions can be seen, as described below, by their correspondence to 
aspects of phenomenal experience. While reference to these dimensions may not fully 
exhaust the relevant complexity of any conscious neural system, they may provide 
guidelines for the development of useful quantitative measures.  
 
Before describing further the above dimensions of relevant complexity, it is 
important to distinguish the space incorporating these dimensions from the proposed 
concept of a multidimensional ‘qualia space’ (3).  Qualia space is a high-dimensional 
space in which the axes reflect dimensions on which phenomenally experienced 
conscious scenes are discriminated (e.g., color, shape, smell, touch, proprioception, etc.). 
The concept of qualia space reflects the observation that conscious scenes consist of 
enormously informative discriminations among a vast repertoire of possible experiences. 
By contrast, the dimensions along which relevant complexity can be measured reflect the 
activity of the physical machinery, mainly in the dynamic core, which entails these 
phenomenal discriminations.  Therefore, although each dimension of relevant complexity 
bears upon aspects of phenomenal experience, there is no necessary one-to-one 
correspondence between dimensions of relevant complexity and dimensions of qualia 
space.   
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Spatial complexity reflects the balance between integration and differentiation in 
the spatial domain.  Not surprisingly, existing measures of relevant complexity, such as 
CN, Φ, and cd, have focused largely on spatial complexity. The spatial structure of a 
conscious scene, which is most salient in the visual modality, is both unified into a 
Gestalt and differentiated into individual features. At the neural level, it is well 
established that different brain regions are specialized for different functions and that the 
activities of these diverse regions must be globally coordinated in order to yield coherent 
behavior. Thus, any theory of consciousness that involves interactions among spatially 
distributed and functionally segregated brain regions immediately faces the task of 
characterizing spatial complexity.    
 
Temporal complexity reflects the fact that consciousness extends over time in 
several ways.  For example, consciousness is associated with the ordering of events into 
complex temporal sequences.  Musical and linguistic phrases, which require 
consciousness for their full apprehension, are prototypical examples of complex temporal 
sequences that cannot be reduced to simple associative chains (34, 35).  Other examples 
include the construction of an internal historical narrative based on episodic memories, 
and the projection of such a narrative into a conditional future (8). Conscious effort also 
appears to be required for the initial learning of complex motor sequences (36), a notion 
supported by neuroimaging studies showing widespread cortical activation during early 
learning as compared to during expression of learned behavior (37-39).  
 
  Consciousness itself involves the generation of a subjective ‘now’ or 
‘remembered present’ (8). Empirical studies suggest that it takes ~100 ms for sensory 
stimuli to be incorporated into a conscious scene (40), and that neuronal ‘readiness 
potentials’ can appear several hundred ms prior to reportable awareness of intentions to 
act (41).  Moreover, conscious scenes subjectively attributed to a particular time can be 
influenced by physical events happening after this time (42). In general, the generation of 
each conscious scene involves the integration of ongoing signals reflecting sensation and 
intention with those reflecting a past history of value-dependent categorization, learning, 
and memory. 
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The above observations are consistent with the notion that conscious experiences 
are both differentiated over time (each temporal component is distinct), and integrated 
over time (time is experienced as a continuum, stretching from a definite past towards an 
indeterminate future). Temporal complexity therefore parallels spatial complexity in 
reflecting the balance between differentiation and integration, but in the temporal domain.  
Accordingly, with suitable modification, some measures of spatial complexity may also 
be applicable in the temporal domain. 
 
The notion of recursive complexity refers to the balance between differentiation 
and integration across different levels of description within a system. At the neural level, 
brains exhibit rich organization at multiple levels of description, ranging from molecular 
interactions within individual synapses, to the dynamics of cortical microcircuits, to 
reentrant interactions among functionally segregated brain regions. The phenomenal 
structure of consciousness also appears to be recursive; for example, the individual 
features of conscious scenes are themselves Gestalts, and must therefore share 
organizational properties with the conscious scene as a whole. 
 
Recursive complexity is related to modular and hierarchical structures within 
networks. Within brains, modular and hierarchical organization reflects constraints on the 
genetic encoding of brain development (43) as well as anatomical constraints such as the 
optimization of axonal lengths (44).  Hierarchical organization may also serve functional 
roles, for example, in the adaptive distribution of reentrant signals (45) and in providing 
robustness of responses to perturbations (46). Hierarchical and compositional structures 
may also relate to recursive relations at the phenomenal level. An example is seen in the 
interactions of heterogeneous elements to form new combinations, in which whole 
categories of things or sequences of events can be treated as single elements in a higher-
level construction based on selection.  This property of compositionality has been most 
widely discussed in contexts concerned with syntactical characteristics of human 
language and logical symbol systems (47, 48). 
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The various dimensions of relevant complexity discussed here require different 
strategies for their quantitative characterization. While we have considered several 
presently available candidate measures of the balance between differentiation and 
integration in the spatial domain, measures appropriate for the analysis of neural systems 
in the temporal domain (49, 50) and in the recursive domain remain to be adequately 
specified.  
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Summary 
 
Given that consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, a satisfactory neural 
theory of consciousness must avoid reductionistic excess. Excessive reductionism (51) 
can be revealed by improper reification, for example by converting a dynamic process 
into a static entity. It may propose the arbitrary agglomeration of different aspects of a 
system into a single common character, and it may involve the improper quantification of 
such an arbitrarily chosen character. According to these criteria, any theory that identifies 
consciousness with a single measure is likely to be excessively reductionistic, and as a 
result, limited in its scope. We suggest that the development and simultaneous application 
of multiple quantitative measures would more appropriately characterize the relevant 
complexity of the neural systems underlying consciousness. Even so, some aspects of 
consciousness are likely to resist quantification altogether.  An adequate theory is 
therefore likely to be one that consists of a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
elements. The TNGS has been proposed with this in mind. It will be greatly enhanced 
when practically calculable multidimensional measures of relevant complexity are 
formulated. 
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1 Consciousness is accompanied by irregular, low-amplitude, fast (12-70Hz) 
electrical brain activity. 
2 Consciousness is associated with activity within the thalamocortical complex (the 
‘dynamic core’), which is modulated by activity in subcortical areas. 
3 Consciousness involves distributed cortical activity related to conscious contents. 
4 Conscious scenes are unitary.  
5 Conscious scenes occur serially - only one conscious scene is experienced at a 
time. 
6 Conscious scenes are metastable and reflect rapidly adaptive discriminations in 
perception and memory. According to the TNGS, qualia are the discriminations 
entailed by the underlying neural activity. 
7 Conscious scenes comprise a wide multimodal range of contents and involve 
multimodal sensory binding. 
8 Conscious scenes have a focus/fringe structure; focal conscious contents are 
modulated by attention. 
9 Consciousness is subjective and private, and is often attributed to an experiencing 
‘self’. 
10 Conscious experience is reportable by humans, verbally and non-verbally.  
11 Consciousness accompanies various forms of learning. Even implicit learning 
initially requires consciousness of stimuli from which regularities are 
unconsciously developed. 
12 Conscious scenes have an allocentric character. They show intentionality, yet are 
shaped by egocentric frameworks.  
13 Consciousness is a necessary aspect of decision making and adaptive planning. 
 
Table 1.  Thirteen features of consciousness that require theoretical explanation.  Items 1 
through 6 are in one degree or another susceptible to characterization by quantitative 
measurement. Items 7 through 13 are more readily understood through logical and 
qualitative analyses.  
 
